INTRODUCTION
In academic literature and political debates the notion of parliamentarization of EU governance normally refers to the gradual but consistent empowerment of the European Parliament (EP).
Among the various EU institutions, the EP is undoubtedly the one that has changed most over the decades. Initially a purely consultative body with members seconded from national parliaments, the EP is now vested with significant legislative, control and budgetary powers. The Parliament shapes EU laws, particularly through the co-decision procedure (discussed below), is involved in the appointment of the Commission and can force it to resign, and decides on the EU's budget together with the Council. Considering the EWM and the broader upgrading of the role of national parliaments by the Lisbon Treaty, it is not surprising that there are stronger expectations regarding domestic legislatures in EU governance. In this new post-Lisbon environment, so the argument goes, domestic legislatures have new tools at their disposal, and this broadened toolkit provides them with incentives to become more strongly involved in EU affairs. However, the analysis in this chapter shows that significant variation between Member State parliaments remains both regarding scrutiny procedures and political motivation, although legislatures throughout the Union have nonetheless gradually learned how to play the European game more effectively.
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The EP and national legislatures are also more in contact with one another through various forms of interparliamentary cooperation. Such cooperation has in recent years become particularly relevant in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 4 and economic governance, two highly salient policy fields where parliamentary scrutiny has often been weak.
Interparliamentary cooperation has at the same time revealed the tensions between the EP and domestic legislatures but also among the national parliaments themselves. Underlying these tensions are often quite strong differences over the source of legitimacy in modern Europe: while some argue that the EP, as the only directly elected EU institution, is the main forum for aggregating citizens' preferences, others, particularly the more Eurosceptical voices, emphasize the participation rights of national parliaments.
This chapter analyses the roles of the European Parliament and national legislatures in
European integration, with particular focus on their individual and collective scrutiny of EU policies. The next two sections examine the various functions the EP and domestic parliaments perform in post-Lisbon Treaty Europe. The challenges involved in interparliamentary cooperation and in scrutiny of CFSP and economic governance are discussed in sections four and five. The concluding discussion underlines the importance of parliamentary debates and argues that while scrutiny, both in terms of legal rights and political motivation, has taken major leaps forward, the multilevel EU governance system presents serious challenges for legislatures, not least regarding informational asymmetries.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: EFFECTIVE SCRUTINY, INNOVATIVE PRACTICES
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are often portrayed as federalists interested primarily in gaining more powers for their institution. Such a mind-set is perfectly understandable given that the powers of the EP have always depended on the preferences of national governments in
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC). Not only has the EP succeeded in lobbying, with essentially each round of Treaty revision assigning more competences to the Parliament, but MEPs themselves have proven remarkably inventive in pushing for more powers between IGCs. This pro-active approach applies particularly to accountability of the Commission.
The key to understanding more effective control of the Commission lies in appointment powers, as the link between EP elections and the composition of the Commission has become more direct since the early 1990s. 5 Because both the Commission and its president must be approved by the Parliament before they can take office (and can also be voted out of office by MEPs), the EP has explicitly demanded that the voice of the voters not be ignored in the make-up of the Commission. Hence the wording of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 17 TEU), according to which the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, 'shall propose to the Parliament' a candidate for Commission president after 'taking into account' the election results merely gave Treaty status to a practice dating back to the mid-1990s.
Before the 2014 elections the Europarties and their EP groups went one step further and put forward 'lead candidates' for the Commission president. This Spitzenkandidaten initiative was criticized heavily by Eurosceptics, with the EP again accused of over-stepping its formal competences. For example, the British Prime Minister David Cameron talked of 'a power grab through the back door' that was never agreed upon by Member States and would both shift power from the European Council to the Parliament and politicize the Commission. 6 Cameron is certainly right in claiming that the Spitzenkandidaten process will strengthen the role of party politics in the has the potential to strengthen the 'electoral connection' between voters and Brussels, thus making it easier to assign credit and blame in EU decision-making. 7 From a more normative viewpoint, one can also argue that since the EU and the Commission already possess significant authority over a broad range of policy areas, the choice of who exercises this authority should be based on competition between political forces, essentially Europarties competing in EP elections.
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The stronger electoral and party political connection, together with the increased legislative powers of the Parliament, has brought about much closer interaction with the Commission. There is more informal behind-the-scenes dialogue and Commissioners appear regularly in the plenary and committees -exactly in the same way as happens in national politics between the legislature and the executive branch. 9 While earlier more confrontational relations have given way to routine interaction, MEPs do subject the Commission to active public scrutiny -and in fact, the party politicization referred to above implies a permanent minority in the chamber less While the national governments represented in the European Council are primarily accountable to their individual legislatures (see Section 5), the EP also scrutinizes the summits.
12
The president of the EP has the right to speak at the start of each European Council meeting, explaining Parliament's positions on the items to be discussed. After the summit the president of the European Council presents a report to the EP plenary on the outcome. And while the political importance of the rotating EU presidency has declined considerably, the prime minister of the country holding the presidency also appears in the plenary to present the priorities for the six-month presidency. Occasionally these plenary debates receive extensive media coverage, as in January the committee stage, thus paving the way for plenary votes adopted by 'supermajorities'.
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Committees are also key forums for holding institutions such as the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) to account and for shaping the EU's budget and monitoring its implementation.
Committees are well-resourced in terms of staff, and when we include also party group staff, MEPs' personal assistants (normally three per member) and a research service that provides assistance to MEPs, it is clear that the Parliament has prioritized policy expertise when deciding its internal organization and rules. 26 Importantly, committees and obviously the plenary meet in public and hence inject much-needed transparency to EU decision-making.
Finally, the Parliament can set up sub-committees and special temporary committees to deal with specific issues -such as human genetics (2001) 26 Policy expertise considerations apply also to rapporteurships, which are distributed among the party groups on the basis of an auction-like points system. While both EP party groups and national parties are using rapporteurships for achieving their policy objectives, the policy expertise of MEPs is also taken into account when allocating reports to table - with the result that MPs may find it hard to choose which instrument to prioritize.
The function most often emphasized is scrutinizing the government in EU affairs.
Indeed, the main Treaty-derived function of national parliaments is to control the governments that Perhaps the biggest question mark with the EWM is that through making national parliaments direct participants in the EU's legislative process, it goes in a way against the very principle of parliamentary democracy. The defining criterion of parliamentary democracy is that the government is accountable to the legislature and can be voted out of office by it. The parliament (the principal) delegates policy-making powers to the executive (its agent), which then rules with the support of the legislature. But now the EWM can reverse these roles. Hence lower chambers will probably in most cases send reasoned opinions only if it is also in the interest of their governments. Indeed, some parliaments, such as the Finnish Eduskunta, have explicitly stated that they view any direct links between national parliaments and EU institutions as problematic, emphasizing that domestic legislatures participate in EU politics indirectly through controlling their governments. More generally, sceptical reviews of the EWM criticize the functioning and effectiveness of the mechanism, arguing it is unlikely to have much effect in practice -for example, either through its narrow judicial scope or because of lack of political motivation. However, given the short history of EWM, the arguments and findings of this literature are understandably quite tentative. 
(b) Debates and Issue Selection
Parliaments are also arenas for public debate, with plenary debates potentially an important mechanism for both holding the government accountable and for deliberating on EU policies. As most of the existing scholarship has focused on oversight procedures, the challenge is to understand which EU matters receive attention from MPs and why. While there are major EU issues ranging from the Euro crisis to Treaty reforms that are salient for all parliaments, the situation is most likely different with ordinary European legislation or other EU policy processes.
That is, the salience of such day-to-day EU matters should vary between Member States, depending for example on the structure of the economy or the geographical location of the country. There is evidence that, at least in some Member States, the level of parliamentary scrutiny is explained by the importance of co-decision legislation or the incentives of government and opposition parties.
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This brings us to the question about comprehensive or more selective participation strategies. Should parliaments be more selective and focus on those EU issues that are genuinely domestically salient? There is no denying that it can be useful, particularly from the point of view of government accountability, to demand information and hear ministers about all matters on the Council and European Council agendas so that MPs can intervene if needed, but legislatures could surely also engage in more forward-looking issue selection with the help of either national or EU documents such as the Commission's annual legislative programme. The comparative literature referred to above does suggest that parliaments -and particularly their administrations 46 -do perform such filtering of EU issues, but more could be done to prevent information overload and to facilitate more targeted scrutiny. This would also be beneficial for both government oversight and communicating with citizens, as more attention would be given to those matters that are domestically salient. As argued convincingly by Winzen:
<quotation>What would it really tell us, if we were to find that parliaments examine 
INTERPARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION
The EU has introduced a new dimension to parliamentary work by facilitating more active international networking. 49 allies favouring weak conferences with limited powers whereas some national legislatures support stronger conferences equipped with broad mandates. 54 Not that much appears to have changed since the so-called Assizes, the first joint conference of the EP and national parliaments convened in 1990, when proceedings were dominated by the EP delegation, with several domestic legislatures feeling that the EP had used the conference to further its own objectives. Nonetheless, the decision to set up conferences in the fields of economic governance and CFSP indicates the challenges parliaments face in scrutiny of these two highly salient policy areas. Though there are special committee meetings surrounding the submission of SCPs in some parliaments, public activity is almost fully lacking, and there is considerable variation between the legislatures. Overall, the Euro crisis and reformed Euro area governance seem to have accentuated the differences between more active and weaker legislatures, with the latter in particular struggling to establish any real control over Euro area decisions. 62 The inevitable conclusion must be that domestic parliamentary scrutiny of European economic governance is far from optimal.
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF CFSP AND EMU
The European Parliament has gradually strengthened its role in economic governance.
Its approval is needed for laws on macroeconomic surveillance such as the 'six pack' and 'two pack' regulations and directives. Beyond such legislative tools, the Parliament basically enjoys rather broad information rights. This applies to the European Semester, where the EP can organize hearings and express its opinions. The ECB reports to the EP regularly, including annual reports on monetary policy and a supervisory report. However, as with CFSP, policy-making is nonetheless still largely intergovernmental and thus beyond direct EP influence. 63 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This overview of parliamentary control shows that European parliaments are becoming more strongly involved in EU governance and are taking on the task of a more penetrating scrutiny function. In so doing parliamentary bodies, most notably committees, are taking over some of the control functions traditionally associated with administrative law. This applies especially to the European Parliament which has grown from a 'talking shop' to a real legislature, participating fully in law-making processes and enjoying budgetary powers that it has used skillfully to extend its control and supervision of executive functions. The EP deserves credit not only for innovative design of its own rules of procedure, but also for establishing pro-actively scrutiny practices that either have later received Treaty status or otherwise provide MEPs with new avenues to influence the EU policy process. Importantly, and no doubt linked to the empowerment of the institution, turnover of MEPs has decreased with a higher share of politicians building careers in the EP -with these individuals also more likely to wield influence in the Parliament through holding leadership positions or acting as rapporteurs. 64 This contributes both to the policy expertise in the Parliament and to the scrutiny it carries out vis-à-vis the other EU institutions.
For national parliaments the situation is more diverse. Overall, they certainly subject their governments to tighter scrutiny in EU affairs than before, but much variation remains -both regarding the efficiency of scrutiny mechanisms and the political will to become engaged in
European issues. Perhaps we should be realistic and not expect too much from national parliaments.
Legislators face competing demands on their time, and despite the increasing relevance of Europe, it is completely logical for MPs and for the whole parliament to delegate many EU matters to governments and to become only selectively involved in European affairs. European integration is also continually evolving, with increasing policy constraints on domestic legislatures, particularly regarding macroeconomic and budgetary policy-making.
Parliaments have a buffet table of avenues to influence the EU policy cycle, but more avenues does not necessarily translate into more influence. Here lessons from multilevel governance (MLG) theorizing seem relevant. According to this framework, the modern regional or This chapter has understandably focused on the scrutiny and control function of parliaments, but these may not be the most important contributions MPs or MEPs can make to EU governance. Indeed, the lack of (domestic) debates on Europe is often seen as a significant 
